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MANSLAUGHTER BY TEXT: IS ENCOURAGING SUICIDE 
MANSLAUGHTER? 
Carla Zavala* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of July 13, 2014, police found an eighteen-year-
old dead in his pick-up truck behind a K-Mart in Fairhaven, 
Massachusetts.1  It was Conrad Roy, whose mother had reported him 
missing after he failed to come home the night before.2  He left his 
mother’s house the previous night, around 6:30 p.m., telling her that 
he would be visiting a friend.3  Instead, the young man drove to the 
Fairhaven K-Mart and filled the passenger cabin of his truck with 
carbon monoxide using a combustion engine.4  By the time the police 
found Conrad the next morning, he was dead.5  According to the 
district attorney’s office, police searched Conrad’s cell phone in the 
course of their investigation and found that he had been text-
messaging Michelle Carter at the time of his death.6 
At the time of Conrad’s suicide, Michelle Carter was a seventeen-
year-old high school student.  She met Conrad in 2012 while both were 
visiting relatives in the same Florida neighborhood.7  The two initiated 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thank you to Professor 
Margaret Lewis for all her guidance and careful edits. 
 1  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17, 
Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015), available 
at http://www.wcvb.com/blob/view/-/34888334/data/1/-/3mh04m/-
/MichelleCarterCourtDocs082415.pdf. 
 2  See id. 
 3  See id. 
 4  See id. 
 5  See  Stephanie Slifer, Is It a Crime to “Encourage Suicide”? Teens’ Texts Under 
Scrutiny, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-
crime-to-encourage-suicide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-and-michelle-
carter/. 
 6  See Investigators Say Plainville Girl ‘Strongly Influenced’ Teen’s Suicide, CBS BOS. 
(Feb. 27, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/02/27/investigators-say-
plainville-girl-strongly-influenced-teens-suicide/. 
 7  See Astead W. Henderdon & John R. Ellement, Judge Won’t Dismiss Case Against 
Teen Who Urged Friend’s Suicide, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/09/23/judge-refuses-dismiss-charge-
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a romantic relationship that was primarily carried on through online 
and cell phone communication, with very little in-person contact.8  
Initially, Michelle admitted to police that she was talking to Conrad at 
the time he committed suicide but claimed she did not know what he 
was doing.9  She said that when the phone call ended, she “did not 
think much of it.”10  Police were able to recover conversations between 
them from Conrad’s cell phone, despite Michelle having asked Conrad 
to delete them.11  Conrad’s text messages revealed a very different 
picture.  For at least a week prior to his suicide, Conrad spoke to 
Michelle about his plans to commit suicide.12  Michelle’s own text 
messages with a friend revealed that she had a forty-seven minute 
telephone conversation with Conrad on the night he committed 
suicide.13 
On February 5, 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle on charges 
of involuntary manslaughter for Conrad’s suicide.14  According to 
prosecutors, Michelle: 
pressured [Conrad] to go through with suicide for almost a 
week before he carried out the act . . . counseled him to 
overcome his fears; researched methods of committing suicide 
painlessly; and lied to police, his family[,] and her friends 
about his whereabouts during the act itself and after.15 
The District Attorney believed Michelle’s involvement “caused 
Conrad’s death by wantonly and recklessly assisting him in poisoning 
himself with carbon monoxide.”16  Bristol County Judge Bettina 
Borders agreed and rejected Michelle’s motion to dismiss on 
September 23, 2015, allowing the prosecution to proceed with the 
 
plainville-teen-suicide/F6IlTaXG7L6X0MJTQAYuyK/story.html. 
 8  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 1. 
 9  See id. at 18. 
 10  Id. 
 11  See Abby Phillip, ‘It’s Now or Never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend 
into Suicide, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-
never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/. 
 12  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 1. 
 13  See id. at 21; see also Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
 14  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 1; Slifer, supra note 5. 
 15  Phillip, supra note 11. 
 16  Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 
24. 
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charges against her.17 
Suicide is a significant problem;18  it is the tenth leading cause of 
death for people of all ages in the United States.19  For Americans 
between ages fifteen and twenty-four, the reality is harsher: suicide is 
the second leading cause of death in this age group.20  High school 
students seem especially vulnerable to attempting suicide.21  This 
means most teenagers and young adults likely know someone who has 
had suicidal thoughts or has attempted suicide.  What if, instead of 
supporting their depressed peers or encouraging them to seek 
psychiatric help, people began supporting their plans to commit 
suicide and pressuring them to kill themselves?  This may be why the 
public found Michelle’s actions so appalling. 
Even a cursory glance at the public’s comments under news 
articles about Michelle’s case will show that many people agree with 
the District Attorney’s decision to charge Michelle.22  Certainly, her 
 
 17  See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
 18  According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over the 
past decade, suicide has increased from a low of 10.4 per 100,000 people in 2000 to 
12.1 per 100,000 people in 2013, the most recent year for which data is available. See 
Suicide Facts, SUICIDE AWARENESS VOICES OF EDUC., 
http://www.save.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.viewPage&page_id=705D5DF4-
055B-F1EC-3F66462866FCB4E6 (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). 
 19  See 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_20
13-a.pdf. 
 20  See id. 
 21  In 2013, 8% of students in high school attempted suicide, compared to 0.6% of 
adults over eighteen years old.  See Suicide Facts at a Glance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-
datasheet-a.pdf. 
 22  See, e.g., Mrs.Be, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure 
Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2015, 10:02 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-
never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments (“This 
girl is a sociopath or mentally ill, anyway, she should not be out of prison for a long 
time!”); Rs1123, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure 
Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST. (Sept. 12, 2015, 10:24 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-
never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments (“What 
a load of BS. She actively worked to push him to commit suicide, pestered him, told 
him how much better off he would be if he was dead, it was a power trip on her part[,] 
and she deserves to be prosecuted for it.”); Rwsmls, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts 
Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST. (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:34 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-
now-or-never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments 
(“She should spend some serious time in prison. She was as close to pulling the trigger 
as you get.”). 
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actions were not those of a model friend, girlfriend, or citizen.  Martin 
W. Healy, Chief Legal Counsel at the Massachusetts Bar Association, 
commented to the Boston Globe that Michelle’s lawyers “do not have 
a particularly sympathetic defendant.”23  But are her actions so 
blameworthy that she should spend twenty years in state prison?24  Not 
all actions that insult society’s conception of moral conduct give rise to 
criminal liability. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the particular circumstances 
of Conrad Roy’s suicide and the role Michelle Carter played in it.  Part 
III of this Comment will analyze the history of how various states have 
treated actions comparable to Michelle’s.  Part IV will separate the 
types of conduct into three categories by the defendant’s level of 
participation in the other person’s suicide.  Part V will argue that a 
statute that specifically proscribes the encouragement of suicide would 
be better suited to achieve the societal goals punishment is intended 
to serve and would be a better alternative for prosecuting Michelle and 
others like her.  Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. THE CASE AGAINST MICHELLE CARTER 
Michelle Carter is accused of encouraging her boyfriend, Conrad 
Roy, to commit suicide, which he eventually did.  This section will 
address the specifics of Michelle’s involvement in Conrad’s suicide.  
Then, it will discuss the arguments raised by the prosecution in its 
charges against Michelle.  Lastly, it will delineate the arguments raised 
by Michelle in her defense. 
A. Michelle Carter’s Role in Conrad Roy’s Suicide 
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy met in 2012, when both teens 
were visiting relatives who lived in Florida.25  Afterwards, they 
developed a romantic relationship.  Although they both lived in 
Massachusetts, their relationship was mostly online.26  According to his 
family, Conrad had been struggling with suicidal thoughts and 
depression for several years.27  Conrad had attempted suicide in 2012 
by ingesting acetaminophen and was treated with medication, 
 
 23  Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
 24  In Massachusetts, manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in 
state prison.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015). 
 25  See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
 26  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 1.  Some sources have reported that the two teens actually met on the internet prior 
to meeting in person.  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
 27  See CBS BOS., supra note 6. 
ZAVALA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] COMMENT 301 
counseling, and hospitalizations at psychiatric facilities.28  Conrad’s 
grandmother, however, claimed that Conrad seemed to be “pulling 
out of [the depression].”29  Text messages between Michelle and 
Conrad show the couple discussed suicide often and in great detail 
over the course of their relationship.30  She told him he was strong 
enough to do it, and that his parents would understand that he had 
reached a point where no one could save him.31 
Over time, Michelle became even more involved in Conrad’s 
suicide plans.  She encouraged him to overcome his fear of death or 
failing in his suicide attempt.32  In one text exchange she told him that 
once he committed suicide he would finally “[get] to be happy in 
heaven.  No more pain.  No more bad thoughts and worries.  [He 
would] be free.”33  Michelle even conducted research and 
recommended methods of suicide.34  On one occasion, Michelle 
specifically suggested that Conrad kill himself by carbon monoxide 
poisoning, which would be “painless” and would definitely work.35  
When Conrad failed to carry out the plans, Michelle expressed her 
frustration to him: “I guess [that I am frustrated], just because you 
always say you are gonna do it but you don’t, but last night I know you 
really wanted to do it and I’m not mad.  Well I mean kind of, I guess.”36  
Michelle complained to him that he always had an excuse for not 
committing suicide.37 
On July 6, 2014, six days before Conrad committed suicide, 
Conrad and Michelle discussed the logistics of his suicide plan.38  
Michelle told him that with carbon monoxide poisoning he would 
“lose consciousness with no pain.  [He would] just fall asleep and die.”39  
On July 9, Conrad realized that his father’s generator, which he was 
 
 28  See Laura Crimaldi, ‘It’s Now or Never,’ Text Said to Friend Allegedly Urged to Kill Self, 
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/25/you-
have-just-tonight-night/jTor3lbphOrwZM9KNEPOLJ/story.html. 
 29  CBS BOS., supra note 6. 
 30  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
 31  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 2. 
 32  See id. at 3. 
 33  Id. 
 34  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
 35  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 2, 3. 
 36  Id. at 4. 
 37  See id. at 4–5. 
 38  See id. at 6. 
 39  Id. 
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going to use to produce carbon monoxide, did not work.40  In the days 
that followed, Michelle and Conrad worked on finding another 
method to produce carbon monoxide and on ensuring that Conrad’s 
parents did not find out about the plan.41 
On July 12, 2014, Michelle and Conrad began their conversation 
at 4:19 a.m., when Michelle suggested that “[i]t’s probably the best 
time now because everyone is sleeping.”42 Throughout the day, 
Michelle asked him if he was going to do it that night and told him 
repeatedly that he was overthinking and needed to “just do it.”43  
Conrad sent his last text message at 6:25 p.m. that evening, when he 
left his mother’s house for the K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.44  
Conrad’s phone records show two forty-minute phone calls with 
Michelle that evening.45  During the second phone call, Conrad exited 
the car and told Michelle that he was afraid the carbon monoxide 
poisoning was working; she told him to “get back in.”46  The next 
morning, police found Conrad’s car in the parking lot, after his 
mother reported him missing.47  Conrad Roy was dead. 
In the days that followed, Michelle told Conrad’s mother and 
sister, her own friend Samantha, and the police that she did not know 
Conrad planned to commit suicide.48  The police searched Michelle’s 
phone and noticed she had deleted her conversation with Conrad after 
7:00 p.m. on the evening he committed suicide.49  When she heard that 
police were looking into Conrad’s text messages as part of his suicide 
investigation, Michelle texted her friend Samantha in a panic, claiming 
that if police were to read her messages to Conrad, she would be 
“done,” his family would hate her, and she could go to jail.50  In 
September, Michelle began telling Samantha that Conrad’s death was 
 
 40  See id. at 8. 
 41  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 9–10. 
 42  See id. at 11. 
 43  See id. at 12–16. 
 44  See id. at 17. 
 45  See id. 
 46  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 17.  The police found this information in Michelle’s text messages to her friend 
Samantha Boardman on September 15, 2014.  See id. at 21 (“I was the one on the phone 
with him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I 
fucken [sic] told him to get back in, Sam, because I knew he would do it all over again 
the next day and I couldn’t have him live that way the way he was living anymore.”). 
 47  See id. 
 48  See id. at 17–18. 
 49  See id. at 18. 
 50  See id. at 21. 
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her fault because she could have stopped him but that Samantha 
would not understand because she had “never helped someone with a 
suicide.”51 
B. District Attorney’s Case 
In February 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle Carter, then 
eighteen years old, for involuntary manslaughter.52  The manslaughter 
statute in Massachusetts does not contain a definition for 
“manslaughter”; instead, its meaning is derived from the common law 
definition.53  Common law defines involuntary manslaughter as “an 
unlawful homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes 
such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.”54  According to the State, 
Michelle’s actions were both objectively and subjectively reckless.55  
Michelle was objectively wanton or reckless because “a normal ordinary 
woman in [her] position would appreciate the danger in advocating 
that carbon monoxide poisoning is a painless and effective way of 
committing suicide to a suicidal teen.”56  Alternatively, the prosecution 
argued that her conduct was also subjectively wanton or reckless 
because, under Michelle’s own admission, she knew that Conrad was 
susceptible to suicidal thoughts, and she had advance knowledge of his 
plan to commit suicide.57  The State alleged that Michelle caused 
 
 51  See id. at 21–22. 
 52  See Michael Miller, Michelle Carter Can Face Manslaughter Charge for Allegedly 
Encouraging Boyfriend’s Suicide, Judge Rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/24/michelle-
carter-can-face-manslaughter-charge-for-allegedly-encouraging-boyfriends-suicide-
judge-rules/.  
 53  See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990); see also MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015). 
 54  See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. 
2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005)).  For purposes 
of manslaughter, “wanton” and “reckless” are considered synonymous.  See, e.g., id. 
(“Wanton or reckless conduct generally involves a wilful [sic] act that is undertaken in 
disregard of the probable harm to others that may result.”); Commonwealth v. 
Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944) (“The words ‘wanton’ and ‘reckless’ are 
practically synonymous in this connection, although the word ‘wanton’ may contain a 
suggestion of arrogance or insolence or heartlessness that is lacking in the word 
‘reckless.’ But intentional conduct to which either word applies is followed by the same 
legal consequences as though both words applied.”). 
 55  A defendant can be found guilty of manslaughter if his or her conduct was 
either objectively or subjectively reckless.  See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 (Mass. 2010); see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 56  Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 
27. 
 57  See id. at 27. 
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Conrad’s death by enabling him to produce carbon monoxide58 and by 
telling him to “get back in [the car]” when he had second thoughts.59 
Alternatively, omission or failure to act when the defendant had a 
duty to act can also constitute wanton or reckless conduct for purposes 
of manslaughter prosecution.60  A defendant has a duty to act if (1) he 
or she has a special relationship to the victim or (2) he or she created 
a life-threatening condition.61  The State relied on the latter theory, 
arguing that Carter created a life-threatening condition for a suicidal 
Conrad by directing Conrad to obtain a generator and pressuring him 
to commit suicide.62  Because she created the life-threatening 
condition, Michelle had a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the 
risk of him carrying out the plan.63  Michelle could have alleviated the 
possible harm to Conrad by either preventing his suicide or alerting 
his family of his plans, but she failed to do so.64 
C. Defendant’s Argument65 
In response to these allegations, Michelle argued that there was 
not enough evidence to sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter 
because she was not wanton or reckless.  First, Michelle argued she did 
not commit an affirmative act that constitutes wanton or reckless 
conduct because there was no evidence that “a physical act of force, 
pressure, violence, or any direct touching by the defendant whatsoever 
led to this manner of death.”66  For this argument, Michelle cited 
Massachusetts case law, which requires that a “physical act” cause the 
victim’s death in a manslaughter charge that is not based on an 
omission.67  She did not provide the physical means for Conrad to 
 
 58  See id. at 32. 
 59  See id. at 30. 
 60  See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910–11 (Mass. 1944). 
 61  See Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang, 25 N.E.3d 315, 328 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2015) (“Duty may be established in one of two ways.  The first is where the defendant 
has a special relationship to the victim. . . . The second is where the defendant ‘creates 
a situation that poses a grave risk of death or serious injury to another.’”). 
 62  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 30. 
 63  See id. at 29. 
 64  See id. at 29–30. 
 65  This Comment will not address Defendant’s arguments that the Massachusetts 
Manslaughter Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case and that 
Michelle Carter is not a “youthful offender.”  See Defendant’s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1518, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum], available at 
https://www.scribd.com/document/278233136/Defense-motion-to-dismiss . 
 66  Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 4. 
 67  See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Mass. 1944) (“Usually 
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commit suicide, and she was not physically present at the time that he 
committed the act.68 
Second, Michelle contended she could not be charged under the 
alternative theory of wanton or reckless conduct by omission.  Michelle 
and Conrad did not have a “special relationship” recognized by law 
that would give rise to a duty to prevent Conrad from committing 
suicide.69  Michelle also argued that she did not “create” the risk of 
death for Conrad because he had contemplated suicide before 
meeting Michelle; therefore, Michelle did not cause his suicidal 
condition.70  Lastly, Michelle argued that her actions were protected by 
the First Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’ 
protections on free speech.71  Based on these arguments, Michelle filed 
a motion to dismiss the charges against her.72  On September 23, 2015, 
Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders rejected the motion to dismiss 
and ruled that the case would proceed.73 
III. PUNISHING SUICIDE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Courts have varied in their treatment of encouraging suicide over 
time, with recent cases tending to apply more lenient punishment.  
This section will examine the history of punishment for assisting 
suicide by discussing: (1) the common law in England and the early 
history of the United States; (2) cases that have punished suicide 
assistance or encouragement as murder; and (3) more recent cases 
tending to punish suicide assistance or encouragement as 
manslaughter. 
A. Common Law 
Common law treated suicide as murder and a felony.74  Under the 
common law of England, it was a “crime against the laws of God and 
 
wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act, like driving an automobile 
or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable harmful consequences to 
another.”); see also Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 
(Mass. 2010) (requiring an intentional act); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 
687 (Mass. 2012) (requiring a physical act). 
 68  See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 14. 
 69  See id. at 5. 
 70  See id. at 9–10. 
 71  See id. at 17–18 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 
2014)). 
 72  See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
 73  See id. 
 74  See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987). 
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man.”75  However, by the very nature of the crime, the felon was out of 
the reach of the law, which created a difficulty in designing a 
punishment.76  As punishment, the “goods and chattels of the criminal 
were forfeited to the [k]ing, his body had an ignominious burial in the 
highway, and he was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de 
se.”77  Because all of the deceased’s property was surrendered to the 
king, the felon’s family and heirs were left to suffer the consequences 
of the suicide. 
The colonies declined to follow the English common law by 
requiring forfeiture.  For example, the common law of Massachusetts 
never required forfeiture of property after suicide.78  Nevertheless, 
suicide was still considered malum in se and a felony under 
Massachusetts common law.79  An act is malum in se if it is “inherently 
immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.”80  Lacking the ability to 
punish the felon, the Massachusetts legislature passed a statute in 1660 
denying “the privilege of being buried in the common burying-place 
of Christians” to those who committed suicide and instead required 
that they be buried on a common highway with a cartload of stones 
over the grave.81  Massachusetts was the only state to adopt the English 
practice of “ignominious burial.”82  The dishonorable burial was 
intended to serve as a “brand of infamy, and as a warning to others to 
beware of the like damnable practices.”83  This law remained in place 
even after the establishment of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.84 
Massachusetts was not the only state to reject the harsh 
 
 75  See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877). 
 76  See id. at 423 (“It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished by any 
proceeding of the courts, for the reason that the person who kills himself has placed 
himself beyond the reach of justice, and nothing can be done.  But the law, 
nevertheless, recognizes suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also 
criminal.”).  
 77  Id. at 425.  England abolished the practice of forfeiture in 1870 and finally 
abolished suicide as a crime in 1961.  See David S. Markson, Note, Punishment of Suicide 
- A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969). 
 78  See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426. 
 79  See id. 
 80  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (10th ed. 2014).  See also William L. Barnes, 
Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and 
Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 646 (1999) (“‘[M]alum in se,’ . . . means wrong in and of 
itself.”). 
 81  See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426. 
 82  See Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 348, 349 (1986) (citing G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 262, 26061 (1957)). 
 83  Mink, 123 Mass. at 426. 
 84  See id. 
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punishment of suicide at English common law.  For example, Michigan 
omitted suicide from its criminal law altogether.85  Some states 
included provisions in their constitutions prohibiting forfeiture of 
property as punishment in general.86  West Virginia went a step further 
in 1923 and enacted a statute that specifically prohibited forfeiture of 
a person’s estate as punishment for suicide.87  Faced with an inability 
to punish the crime, many states decided not to treat suicide as a crime 
at all when they moved away from the common law and shifted toward 
statutory crimes.88  Other states retained the common law crime of 
suicide in order to allow them to punish suicide attempts.89 
It is less clear whether assisting suicide was a crime at common law.  
According to some sources, aiding, advising, or abetting a suicide was 
murderjust as committing suicide was murder.90  The aider and 
abettor was treated as “a principal in the second degree to the self-
murder of the other.”91  Other sources suggest the common law 
punished assisting suicide under a theory of accomplice liability.92  As 
a result, the accomplice was treated differently depending on whether 
he or she was present at the time of the suicide.  If the accomplice was 
present at the time of the act, he or she was considered a principal and 
could be convicted of the crime of suicide.93  If the accomplice 
encouraged suicide, but was not present at the time of the act, he or 
she was considered an accessory, but would avoid punishment because 
an accessory could not be convicted without the conviction of the 
principal.94  However, this treatment was premised on the idea that 
suicide was a crime to which the defendant could be a party, which was 
not always the case.95 
 
 85  See Donald Wright, Note, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 156, 157 (1975). 
 86  See id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1). 
 87  See W. VA. CODE § 61-11-4 (2015) (“No suicide or attainder of felony shall work 
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”). 
 88  See Wright, supra note 85, at 157. 
 89  See id. 
 90  See, e.g., State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987); In re Joseph G., 667 
P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983). 
 91  Id. 
 92  See Wright, supra note 85, at 161. 
 93  See id. 
 94  See Markson, supra note 77, at 473. 
 95  See Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (holding that the 
defendant could not be an accomplice to suicide because suicide was not a crime in 
the state), overruled by Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).  
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B. Encouraging Suicide as Murder 
Early decisions by Massachusetts courts treated assisting suicide as 
murder.  In the 1816 case of Commonwealth v. Bowen, a Massachusetts 
court convicted defendant-Bowen for murder after he encouraged a 
fellow inmate to commit suicide.96  Bowen’s cell was adjacent to 
another prisoner’s, which allowed the men to converse freely with one 
another.97  Bowen was accused of encouraging the other prisoner to 
commit suicide in order to deprive the sheriff and the townspeople of 
the opportunity to see him executed.98  The night before the other 
prisoner was scheduled for execution, he took Bowen’s advice and 
hung himself in his cell.99  Bowen was charged with murder, and the 
court found that “where one counseled [sic] another to commit 
suicide, who by reason of his advice, and in his presence, did so, the 
adviser was guilty of murder.”100 
In 1877, the Massachusetts Supreme Court revisited this 
application of the murder statute in Commonwealth v. Mink, which 
involved a woman who was charged with murder after accidentally 
killing her fiancé during an attempt to kill herself.101  Defendant-Mink 
threatened to kill herself when her fiancé threatened to leave her.102  
He tried to prevent her from committing suicide, and in the ensuing 
struggle, she shot and killed him.103  Though the court proceeded 
under a theory of felony murder, it discussed in detail and affirmed 
the holding in Bowen, stating that “if a man murders himself, and one 
stands by, aiding in and abetting the death, he is as guilty as if he had 
conducted himself in the same manner where A[] murders B.  And if 
one becomes the procuring cause of death, though absent, he is 
accessory.”104 
This approach to suicide is not unique to Massachusetts.  In its 
1872 decision, Blackburn v. State,105 an Ohio court heard a case where 
the defendant administered poison to a woman, who eventually died 
 
 96  Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 359-60 (1816).  The facts of this case 
are largely laid out in a later Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 
422, 427 (1877). 
 97  Bowen, 13 Mass. at 356. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877). 
 101  See id. at 422. 
 102  See id. at 422–23. 
 103  See id. at 423. 
 104  Id. at 428. 
 105  Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969). 
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as a result.106  Evidence showed that the defendant and the decedent 
had agreed to commit suicide together.107  Evidence also showed, 
however, that the defendant, “by threats of violence or otherwise, 
forced [the woman] to swallow the poison, or forced it down her 
throat.”108  The defendant argued that Ohio does not have a law 
prohibiting suicide, and therefore, he could “not be a criminal 
accessory, nor a criminal principal in the second degree, to an act 
which is not itself a crime.”109  The court found it immaterial whether 
the victim took the poison by choice or if she succumbed to pressure 
from the defendant.110  Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
the defendant was not being prosecuted for assisting in suicide but for 
administering poison to another person, which is murder regardless of 
the other person’s wishes or condition.111  Similarly, in its 1920 
decision, People v. Roberts, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a man 
committed murder when he mixed poison for his wife with multiple 
sclerosis and left it at her bedside, especially since her condition would 
not have allowed her to obtain the poison without his help.112 
However, in 1983, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that 
Roberts no longer represented the law of Michigan.  In People v. 
Campbell, the court held that encouraging suicide and even providing 
the murder weapon could not be murder because murder was the 
unlawful killing of another.113  Campbell was drinking with another man 
who became depressed and suicidal during the course of their 
drinking together.114  Campbell encouraged the man to buy a gun, and 
when he refused, Campbell went to his house to get his own gun.115  
Campbell left his gun with the other man, who used it to kill himself.116  
Michigan’s murder statute did not include a definition for homicide, 
so the court derived its definition from the common law, which 
defined homicide as the killing of one human being by another.117  
Since the man killed himself, there was no homicide to which 
 
 106  See id. at 147. 
 107  See id. at 148–49. 
 108  See id. at 148. 
 109  Id. at 153. 
 110  See id. at 162–63. 
 111  Blackburn, 23 Ohio St. at 163–64. 
 112  See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v. 
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). 
 113  See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 2930 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 114  See id. at 28.  
 115  See id. 
 116  See id. at 29. 
 117  See id. 
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Campbell could have been a party.118  Furthermore, in order to find 
the defendant guilty, the court required that the defendant want to kill 
the man himself, not only that he want the man to die.119  As a final 
consideration, the court noted that there had been a trend towards 
charging assistance or aiding in a suicide as manslaughter, but not 
murder, which the court interpreted as a reflection of the “moral 
values of the present day.”120 
C. Encouraging Suicide as Manslaughter 
Consistent with the observation of the Michigan court in Campbell, 
more recent cases have been less harsh than the courts in Bowen and 
Blackburn, charging those who encourage or assist suicide with 
manslaughter, instead of murder.  For example, Massachusetts backed 
away from its harsh treatment of encouraging suicide in Bowen and 
shifted towards treating it as manslaughter.  Massachusetts’s statute 
prohibiting manslaughter does not define the term “manslaughter.”121  
Instead, manslaughter derives its elements from its common law 
definition.122  The common law defined involuntary manslaughter as 
“an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the commission 
of an unlawful act, malum in se, [] not amounting to a felony nor likely 
to endanger life . . . or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard 
of probable harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton 
or reckless conduct.”123  Wanton or reckless conduct is defined as 
“intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission 
where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.”124  Therefore, 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires finding that (1) the 
defendant intended to commit an act, (2) the act the defendant 
intended to commit was wanton or reckless, and (3) the act caused the 
victim’s death.125 
 
 118  See id. at 30. 
 119  See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 30. 
 120  See id. 
 121  “Whoever commits manslaughter shall, except as hereinafter provided, be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a 
fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or a house of 
correction for not more than two and one half years.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, 
§ 13 (West 2015). 
 122  See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990). 
 123  See id.  The court in Catalina abolished the first kind of manslaughter, a death 
that occurs during an act that is malum in se but not a felony.  See id. at 977–78. 
 124  See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1994). 
 125  See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 
(Mass. 2010). 
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Conduct satisfies the wanton or reckless requirement if it is either 
objectively or subjectively wanton or reckless.126  Conduct is objectively 
wanton or reckless “if an ordinary normal [person] under the same 
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.”127  For 
conduct to be subjectively wanton or recklessness, the “grave danger to 
others must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen 
to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so as to avoid the 
act or omission [that] caused the harm.”128  Lastly, the intentional, 
wanton or reckless conduct must be the cause of the death that occurs.  
Courts have defined “cause” as conduct which, “in the natural and 
continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the 
death would not have occurred.”129 
A typical manslaughter case is based on affirmative conduct that 
causes the death of a victim.  Two separate Massachusetts cases are 
instructive here.  In Commonwealth v. McCauley, the defendant was 
charged with involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed one of 
his friends.130  The court found that the evidence that McCauley was 
not familiar with guns, had no intent to kill the victim, and did not 
know the gun was loaded was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction for 
manslaughter.131  More recently, in Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals charged the defendant with 
involuntary manslaughter for shooting his friend in the chest.132  Like 
in McCauley, the court found the evidence that the defendant “did not 
know whether the gun was fully loaded” and his testimony that he had 
never fired the gun before sufficient to support a charge of involuntary 
manslaughter.133 
Encouraging suicide does not fit as neatly into the definition of 
manslaughter because there is usually an intervening act by the victim, 
which causes death.  Still, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has 
previously upheld a charge of involuntary manslaughter to an alleged 
assisted suicide. In Persampieri v. Commonwealth, defendant-Persampieri 
 
 126  See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012) (“Wanton or 
reckless conduct is determined based either on the defendant’s specific knowledge or 
on what a reasonable person should have known in the circumstances.”). 
 127  See id. (citing Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 902). 
 128  See id. 
 129  See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980) (citing 
California Jury Instructions, Criminal § 8.55 (4th rev. ed. 1979)); see also discussion infra 
Part IV. 
 130  See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Mass. 1969). 
 131  Id. at 429. 
 132  See Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871 N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2007). 
 133  See id. at 1089. 
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was charged with involuntary manslaughter after his wife committed 
suicide.134  Persampieri had allegedly loaded the gun for his wife at her 
request and made suggestions that would make it easier for her to 
discharge the gun.135  He also taunted her for being “too chicken” to 
kill herself, as she had attempted suicide twice before, but failed both 
times.136  The court held that involuntary manslaughter was an 
appropriate charge because the defendant aided his wife’s self-murder 
by being present in the room during the suicide, encouraging his wife 
to kill herself, and taunting her with accusations of being too scared to 
do it.137 
Courts in other states have similarly held that a defendant is guilty 
of manslaughter if he or she provides the physical means of suicide 
while encouraging the victim to carry out a suicide plan.  The Iowa 
Supreme Court took this approach in State v. Marti.138  In this 1980 case, 
the court held that loading a gun for a suicidal person and 
encouraging him or her to commit suicide is criminal because “it 
constitutes murder or manslaughter, not because it coincidentally 
helped someone to die who wanted to die anyway.”139  In 1992, an 
appellate court in New York affirmed a manslaughter conviction where 
the defendant goaded the victim to kill himself, knowing that the 
victim was drunk and depressed.140  According to the court, the 
defendant acted recklessly because he knew there was a substantial risk 
that the victim would heed his advice and kill himself, due to his 
depression and intoxication.141 
IV. CATEGORIES OF ENCOURAGING SUICIDE 
Part of the reason that punishing actions like Michelle’s and other 
similar cases is so difficult is the lack of clear, legally significant 
categories of offenses.  Cases involving assisting or encouraging suicide 
fall mainly into three broad categories, with varying degrees of 
involvement on behalf of both the defendant and the victim.  Each 
category is defined by the causal connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the other person’s suicide, which is also known as the 
 
 134  See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). 
 135  See id. 
 136  See id. 
 137  See id. at 390. 
 138  State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
 139  Id. at 581. 
 140  See People v. Duffy, 586 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 141  See id.  
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“causation” element of the offense.142  A defendant’s act satisfies the 
causation element of a criminal offense if it is both the actual cause 
and the proximate cause of the prohibited result.143  In this case, the 
prohibited result is the suicide of the other person.  First, the 
defendant’s act is the actual cause of a suicide if it is a cause without 
which the result, in this case the suicide, would not have occurred 
when it did.144  Second, the defendant’s act is the proximate cause of 
the suicide if it produced the death in a natural and continuous 
sequence of events.145  This section will divide the cases into three 
categories based on whether the defendant’s actions satisfied these 
types of causation for the suicide of another person. 
A. Defendant Kills Victim Who Wanted to Die 
The first category of cases involves those defendants who 
physically kill the victim.  Typically, the defendant will be charged with 
murder, regardless of the fact that the victim might have wanted to die 
anyway.  In this category, the defendant is both the proximate cause 
and the but-for cause of the other person’s death.  In People v. Matlock,146 
the defendant claimed that the man he robbed and murdered had 
requested that he do so.  According to Matlock, the victim wanted to 
die so that his family could collect his life insurance policy, but the 
policy did not cover suicide, so he enlisted the defendant’s help.147  In 
evaluating the defendant’s appeal, the court noted that the defendant 
had clearly committed murder, regardless of whether his allegations 
about the victim’s wishes were true.148  Similarly, in 1981, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas held that murder was an appropriate charge where the 
defendant had administered a lethal dose of cocaine at the victim’s 
request and later shot the victim in the head when the cocaine failed 
to bring about the victim’s death.149 
These cases fall easily into the category of murder or voluntary 
 
 142  See Michael S. Moore, Causation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 151 
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW 182–83 (6th ed. 2012). 
 143  See DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 184. 
 144  See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 391–92 (2d 
ed. 1985); see also DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 184. 
 145  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 856 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); 
Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980).  
 146  People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959). 
 147  See id. at 509. 
 148  See id. at 513 (finding that evidence tending to corroborate the defendant’s 
story went solely to the question of the degree of the murder).  
 149  See State v. Cobb, 625 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Kan. 1981). 
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manslaughter, even if they are not typical murders.  Although the 
victim allegedly wanted to die, their death was still at the hands of the 
defendants.  In both of these cases, the defendants, not the victims, 
were the physical actors.  This fact pattern is in-line with both the legal 
and the layperson’s concepts of murder.  Even Mink can be put in this 
category, because, there, the defendant killed her fiancé by 
accidentally shooting him; the fact that the fatal shooting happened 
during her own suicide attempt is an irrelevant circumstance.150  These 
cases fall easily into existing categories of murder or manslaughter. 
B. Defendant Provides Instrument Used in Suicide 
Another category of cases involves defendants who provide a 
suicidal individual with the weapon or means to commit suicide, with 
knowledge that the person wanted to commit suicide.  In this category, 
the defendant is the actual cause—but not the proximate cause—of 
the person’s suicide.  The defendant gives the individual the means to 
commit suicide, but the other person’s act produces the suicide.  If the 
act of the other was free, deliberate, and informed, the intervening act 
is a superseding cause of the suicide.151  Cases that fall in this category 
include providing a suicidal individual with a gun;152 loading the gun 
for a suicidal individual;153 and providing poison to someone who is 
suicidal.154  Cases like these have received more varied treatment from 
courts, ranging from murder convictions155 to findings of no liability at 
all.156 
Courts struggle with these cases because the “victim” commits the 
act that directly causes his or her own death, like taking the poison or 
shooting themselves with the loaded gun.157  However, the defendant 
 
 150  See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877). 
 151  See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 144, at 326 (“The free, deliberate, and informed 
intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation created by the 
first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first actor of 
criminal responsibility.”). 
 152  See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 153  See, e.g., State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 580 (Iowa 1980); Persampieri v. 
Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). 
 154  See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v. 
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994). 
 155  See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163–64 (1872), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969). 
 156  See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 29. 
 157  Compare Roberts, 178 N.W. at 693 (“[W]hen defendant mixed the paris green 
with water and placed it within reach of his wife to enable her to put an end to her 
suffering by putting an end to her life, he was guilty of murder by means of poison 
within the meaning of the statute, even though she requested him to do so.”), with 
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (“Where a defendant merely 
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provided the instrument used for the murder, and in some cases, the 
victim would not have been able to obtain the instrument without the 
defendant’s action.158  The defendant’s acts are blameworthy, but 
would not have led to a death without the victim’s intervening action. 
C. Defendant Verbally Encourages Suicide 
A third category of cases involves defendants who do not commit 
physical actions that lead to the victim’s death.  Instead, the defendants 
verbally encourage the victim to commit suicide.  Arguably, the 
defendants in this category of cases are neither the actual cause nor 
the proximate cause of the suicide.  Not only does the other person’s 
free, deliberate, and informed act of committing suicide break the 
causal connection,159 but also, the defendant’s act was not an actual 
cause of the suicide.  The defendant neither kills the other person nor 
provides the means for suicide.  The defendant is not even physically 
with the other individual when he or she commits suicide.160  Thus, the 
victim could have committed suicide without the defendant’s 
intervention. 
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant did not commit a physical 
act to help another person commit suicide.161  Melchert-Dinkel posed 
as a suicidal nurse on message boards that provided emotional support 
for people who were also suicidal.162  Two of the people with whom 
Melchert-Dinkel had contact eventually committed suicide.163  The 
individuals who committed suicide lived in England and Canada, while 
Melchert-Dinkel was in Minnesota.164  Similarly, Michelle was thirty 
miles away when Conrad committed suicide.165  She did not physically 
 
is involved in the events leading up to the death, such as providing the means, the 
proper charge is assisting in a suicide [not murder].”). 
 158  See, e.g., Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389 (victim unable to load gun herself); 
Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 28 (victim did not have his own gun); Roberts, 178 N.W. at 191 
(victim’s multiple sclerosis made her helpless). 
 159  See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 144, at 326. 
 160  At common law, an individual was held liable for the suicide of another if they 
were physically present when the other person committed suicide.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816); see also discussion supra Part III.A. 
 161  See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). 
 162  See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).   
 163  See id. at 17–18.  Michigan charged Melchert-Dinkel with violating a statute that 
criminalized the encouragement and assistance of suicide.  See id. at 16.  He challenged 
the constitutionality of the statute, and the court held it to be invalid as applied to 
speech encouraging suicide, but upheld it as applied to assistance of suicide, which 
the court defined as “help, which in turn is defined as to provide (a person etc.) with 
what is needed for a purpose.”  See id. at 20–24.   
 164  See Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16. 
 165  See Slifer, supra note 5. 
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plug the power into the generator that caused his death; she did not 
provide him with the generator.  She was at her home, talking to 
Conrad from a remote location.166 
Because these defendants were not the actual nor proximate 
causes, their cases are much more difficult to fit into traditional 
concepts of murder or manslaughter.  Nevertheless, the defendants 
did contribute, if slightly, to the suicide.  Even Michelle knew that she 
could potentially face consequences for her encouragement, though 
she likely could not imagine she would face charges of manslaughter.167  
In some ways, this kind of encouragement seems more culpable than 
someone who physically helps a terminally-ill loved one commit 
suicide, although the latter would fall into the category of providing 
physical means for suicide.168  Even so, defendants who verbally 
encourage another’s suicide are distinguishable from usual murder 
cases or accidental shootings, which are more typical manslaughters. 
V. A STATUTORY SOLUTION 
Instead of punishing encouragement169 or physical assistance of 
suicide under a theory of murder or manslaughter, states could 
proscribe this conduct with a statute that would specifically prohibit 
the assistance of suicide.  This section will recommend a statute under 
which encouragement and assistance to suicide can be prosecuted 
without resorting to manslaughter or murder statutes.  Then, it will 
compare how prosecution under the proposed theory compares to the 
current approach in achieving the societal goals that punishment is 
supposed to serve. 
A. The Statute 
In People v. Campbell, when deciding a charge of murder for 
assisting suicide, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the decision 
of whether to criminalize incitement to suicide belongs to the 
 
 166  See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 12. 
 167  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, 
at 21 (“I didn’t bully him or anything? So you don’t think they’ll really tell his family?”). 
 168  See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 691–92 (Mich. 1920) (defendant 
provided his wife with poison to relieve her of the pain caused by multiple sclerosis), 
overruled by People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994).  This Comment 
will not discuss the specific circumstance of physician-assisted suicide, as that specific 
circumstance raises very different issues and requires different safeguards and 
treatment in law. 
 169  For purposes of this discussion, “encouragement” is defined as verbal 
incitement, as distinguished from providing material assistance, which is used to 
denote physical participation in the suicide (i.e. providing a gun). 
ZAVALA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] COMMENT 317 
legislature.170  The Model Penal Code treats “causing” a suicide as 
criminal homicide “only if [the defendant] purposely causes such 
suicide by force, duress or deception.”171  A separate provision makes it 
a crime to “aid or solicit” suicide.172  An example of “causing” suicide 
would be a defendant who brutally beats a victim, threatening that if 
she does not jump out of an eleventh floor window to her death, he 
will personally beat her to death.173  Though the defendant did not 
physically throw the victim out of the window, the victim committed 
suicide under duress.  This kind of duress or coercion is different from 
a case where a defendant provides a gun or verbal encouragement to 
an individual who was already suicidal before the defendant 
intervened. 
Verbal encouragement and physical assistance would fall into the 
category of “aiding or soliciting” suicide, which is a second degree 
felony and an offense separate from homicide, under the Model Penal 
Code’s formulation.174  The maximum sentence for second degree 
felonies in the Model Penal Code’s tentative sentencing guidelines is 
twenty years imprisonment, which was increased from ten years 
imprisonment in the original draft.175  Some states have enacted 
specific statutes that criminalize assisting or aiding suicide, but punish 
the offense at or about the same level as manslaughter.176  A specific 
statute should include provisions for lesser punishment, to 
accommodate the diminished culpability of the defendant, in light of 
the victim’s own intervening acts that caused his or her death. 
A specific statute should also provide a definition for what kind of 
assistance would rise to the level of “aid” to a suicide.  One suggestion 
 
 170  See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).  Other courts 
have also taken a similar position, finding no liability for assisting or aiding suicide in 
the absence of a specific statute prohibiting the act.  See, e.g., Grace v. State, 69 S.W. 
529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902). 
 171  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(1) (1985). 
 172  See id. at § 210.5(2). 
 173  See State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13, 15–17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) 
(charging with murder). 
 174  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (1985) (“Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an 
Independent Offense.  A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit 
suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or 
an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor.”). 
 175  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 176  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2015) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
401 (West 2016) (felony); FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2015) (manslaughter, second degree 
felony).  But compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 2015) (promoting a suicide 
attempt is a class E felony with a maximum prison sentence of four years), with N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2015) (second degree manslaughter is a class C felony 
with a maximum sentence of fifteen years). 
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would be to expand the Model Penal Code provision to distinguish 
between the different types of assistance.  Thus, under such a statute, 
a defendant is guilty of assistance to suicide if he or she: (1) 
“intentionally provides the means by which suicide is attempted or 
committed” or (2) intentionally acts as a suicide participant.177  A 
suicide participant is a person, other than the victim, who “actively, 
affirmatively participates in the act of suicide.”178  In other words, 
liability for assisting suicide would be limited to those who are both the 
actual and proximate cause of the victim’s suicide.  Alternatively, the 
state could choose to limit liability to those who physically participate 
in the suicide.179  If a state legislature wants the statute’s prohibition to 
reach conduct that is merely verbal encouragement, they can include 
a prohibition for causing or soliciting a suicide by means of duress.  If 
the victim acted under duress, their intervening act would not be the 
kind of free, deliberate, and informed act that breaks the causal chain 
between the defendant’s act and the ensuing suicide.  The fact-finder 
at trial would then determine whether the defendant’s actions rose to 
the level of duress. 
B. Evaluating the Alternatives 
Society punishes criminals in order to achieve certain goals.  
Criminal punishment seeks to attain four goals: deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.180  An adequate 
criminal punishment should achieve one or more of these goals.181  
This section will compare how well manslaughter and the proposed 
 
 177  See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 372. 
 178  Id. 
 179  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2015) (statute criminalizing assistance to 
suicide defines “assistance” as “the act of physically helping or physically providing the 
means”).  After the Michigan courts struggled to apply manslaughter and murder 
theories in cases like Roberts and Campbell, the Michigan legislature enacted a statute 
that prohibits providing the physical means for suicide or participating in the physical 
act of suicide if the defendant knew that the victim intended to commit suicide.  See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (2016). 
 180  See, e.g., Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A 
History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 398–403 (1996); Gregory G. Jackson, 
Punishments for Reckless Skiing–Is the Law Too Extreme?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 619, 634–39 
(2002); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 1.5 (2d ed. 2015). 
 181  According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a court imposing a criminal 
sentence shall consider the need for the sentence imposed to: (1) “reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense” (retributivism); (2) “afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct” (deterrence); (3) “to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant” (restraint); and (4) “provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner” (rehabilitation).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
ZAVALA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] COMMENT 319 
specific statute achieves each of these goals. 
1. Deterrence 
One goal of criminal punishment is deterrence.  There are two 
kinds of deterrence: specific deterrence and general deterrence.  
According to the theory of specific deterrence, criminal punishment 
aims to deter the criminal, rather than others, from committing 
further crimes, by giving her an unpleasant experience she will not 
want to endure again.182  This theory of punishment requires the 
deterrence of the particular defendant.  Under this view, Michelle 
Carter should be prosecuted so that she will not commit this crime 
again.  However, there is no evidence that Michelle made Conrad 
suicidal or sought him out for that reason.  To the contrary, Conrad 
was suicidal and was treated for depression and mental illness before 
he even met Michelle.183  There is also evidence that Michelle regretted 
not doing more to prevent Conrad from killing himself.184  A statutory 
prohibition punishes Michelle, while allowing leniency to be tailored 
to the crime she committed.  Restraint185 and rehabilitation,186 which 
are discussed further below, are often considered types of specific 
deterrence.187 
General deterrence argues for the punishment of offenders as a 
way of sending a message to other people who might consider 
engaging in the same conduct in the future.  According to the general 
deterrence theory, other people will see the harsh punishment 
imposed upon the offender and will not want to suffer the same fate, 
so they will not engage in the behavior.188  In the case of encouraging 
or aiding suicide, criminal prosecution seeks to deter people from 
encouraging another’s suicide to advance their own personal motives, 
like pursuing an inheritance or ridding themselves of a burdensome 
dependent.189 
There is evidence that general deterrence is mildly effective for 
 
 182  See LAFAVE, supra note 180. 
 183  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
 184  See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 20. 
 185  See infra Part V.B.ii. 
 186  See infra Part V.B.iii. 
 187  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 80, at 633. 
 188  See id. at 631. 
 189  See Wright, supra note 85, at 162. 
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malum prohibitum190 offenses, but not for other kinds of crime.191  Three 
requirements must be met in order for this kind of deterrence to be 
effective.192  First, the potential offender must know of the law 
prohibiting the conduct.193  Second, the offender must perceive the 
cost of violating the law as greater than any benefit he or she will derive 
from committing the crime.194  Lastly, the potential offender must be 
able and willing to allow this knowledge to influence his or her 
actions.195  Under this analysis, it is unlikely that charging Michelle with 
manslaughter will deter others from engaging in the same behavior. 
First, the public is probably unaware that some jurisdictions 
punish encouraging suicide, in any form, as murder or manslaughter.  
Michelle’s case has been widely reported and has brought attention to 
the possibility of being charged with involuntary manslaughter for 
encouraging suicide.  Prior to her case, however, the average person 
was likely unaware that verbal encouragement—or even incitement—
of suicide could be manslaughter.  As time passes and Michelle’s case 
fades from the public eye, the general population will again forget, and 
any potential deterrent effect will be lost.  A specific statute that 
proscribes certain kinds of encouragement and assistance of suicide 
would leave no doubt in the mind of both law enforcement and citizens 
that such acts are prohibited.  A clear, straightforward prohibition on 
encouragement or assistance to suicide would at least increase the 
likelihood that a potential offender can understand the law.196 
Second, effective general deterrence requires the offender to 
perceive the cost of punishment to be greater than any benefit from 
the violation. Even those who are aware of the possibility of being 
charged with manslaughter for encouraging another’s suicide might 
still believe that they are unlikely to be caught or prosecuted.  This will 
influence their balancing of the costs and benefits of committing the 
prohibited act.  For example, Michelle asked Conrad to delete their 
text message conversations before committing suicide so that she 
 
 190  An offense is categorized as malum prohibitum if it is wrong only because it is 
proscribed by law, as opposed to malum in se offenses, which are inherently wrong.  See 
Barnes, supra note 80, at 646. 
 191  See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, at 45–46 (1974). 
 192  See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) 
(arguing that criminal punishment does very little to deter potential offenders).  
 193  See id. at 954. 
 194  See id. 
 195  See id. at 954–56. 
 196  See id. at 989 (“[T]here are ways in which knowledge of [a criminal law rule] 
can be increased. . . . [A] bare prohibition itself is the easiest rule to convey.”). 
ZAVALA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] COMMENT 321 
would not be associated with his death.197  Furthermore, prosecution 
for encouraging suicide is sporadic and often leads to wildly 
inconsistent outcomes.198  This is certainly true in Michelle’s case.  The 
last reported case of a charge of manslaughter for encouraging suicide 
in Massachusetts was Persampieri v. Commonwealth in 1961.199  Delay 
between the commission of the act and the eventual punishment may 
also distort any cost-benefit analysis a potential offender might 
undertake, making benefits seem much greater than any costs which 
he or she believes to be far off.200  Michelle’s case has been significantly 
delayed by motions and arguments about whether or not her actions 
fit the definition of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts 
precedent.201  If Massachusetts passed the proposed statute that 
specifically prohibited encouraging suicide, such issues would be 
easier to decide because the statute would define the offense.  As 
jurisprudence develops, appellate courts would resolve ambiguities 
that remain in the application of the statute. 
The final prerequisite for deterrence to be effective requires that 
the offender use the calculation of costs against benefits to influence 
his or her decisions.  It is likely that offenders do not consider the legal 
implications of their acts at all.  For example, use of drugs and alcohol 
often impairs an offender’s judgment.202  Critics of the theory of both 
general and specific deterrence argue that the idea of a criminal 
rational actor is an oxymoron.203  This is especially true in situations rife 
with emotion like those involving suicide.204  Michelle probably did not 
 
 197  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
 198  See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 370–71 (arguing that police and prosecutorial 
discretion tends to make prosecution of encouraging suicide ineffective and results in 
injustice whenever charges are pursued).   
 199  See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).  Some 
sources reported that Bristol County District Attorney Thomas Quinn had a 
relationship with Conrad’s family, and he eventually recused himself from the case.  
CBS BOS., supra note 6.  It is not clear whether his relationship influenced the decision 
to bring charges against Michelle. 
 200  See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954. 
 201  Conrad committed suicide in July 2014, and the Judge decided the Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss in September 2015.  See Miller, supra note 52. 
 202  See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954–56. 
 203  See Barnes, supra note 80, at 631; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT 
CRIME 118 (rev. ed. 1983) (“[S]ome scholars contend that a large fraction of crime is 
committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or abnormal that even if there 
were no delay, uncertainty, or ignorance attached to the consequences of criminality, 
we would still have a lot of crime.”). 
 204  See generally Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide Meaning 
and Motivation, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 285, 287–99 (1996) (identifying depression, 
ambivalence, and psychodynamics as factors that influence an individual’s decision to 
commit suicide or request physician assisted suicide). 
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consider the costs or possible consequences of her encouragement in 
the weeks leading up to Conrad’s suicide.  It was not until afterwards 
that she seemed to consider that she could be prosecuted for her 
involvement.205 
2. Restraint 
Restraint, also called incapacitation, is a theory of punishment 
focused on removing the criminal from society.206  According to this 
theory, if a defendant is imprisoned or restrained in some way, then he 
or she cannot commit more crimes and cannot possibly do more harm 
to society.207  The only way to incapacitate an offender completely is to 
put them to death, since that will permanently remove them from 
society.208  Any other form of incapacitation is by definition less than 
complete.  Therefore, unless the state sentenced all offenders to death 
or life in prison, how well punishment achieves incapacitation is a 
matter of degree.  Even offenders serving life in prison without 
possibility of parole remain members of prison society and, in some 
cases, can continue their life of crime within the prison.209  Restraint 
can, however, be furthered through other means. When offenders are 
put in prison, they are isolated from general society for some period of 
time, protecting at least some part of the population from their crimes.  
Electronic monitoring systems provide an alternative to incarceration 
while still restraining the offender to some degree.210  In the case of 
punishing suicide encouragement, prosecution for manslaughter 
would carry a longer prison term than would a specific statute, which 
would impose a lighter sentence.  Therefore, if removing Michelle 
 
 205  Michelle requested that Conrad delete her text messages from his phone on 
the night he committed suicide, and deleted them from her own phone as well.  
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 23.  This 
is the first indication that Michelle was aware that her actions were wrong.  She later 
sent text messages to her friend Samantha expressing her fear that she might be 
prosecuted.  See id. at 29. 
 206  See Jackson, supra note 180, at 637. 
 207  See Dugger, supra note 180, at 401. 
 208  See id. at 402. 
 209  Id. (“[A] life sentence (most generally, life without the possibility of parole) also 
keeps [offenders] away from us.  It just keeps them alive and away from us, in their 
own society, rather than dead and away from us.”); see also Barnes, supra note 80, at 632 
(“Is a murderer really incapacitated if he murders other prisoners while behind 
bars?”). 
 210  Massachusetts utilizes an electronic monitoring program as an alternative to 
incarceration and to provide an extra level of supervision of probationers and 
parolees.  See generally The Electronic Monitoring Program Fact Sheet 2014, MASS. PROB. 
SERV. 1, http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/probation/elmofactsheet.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016). 
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from the general public were the ultimate goal, a charge of 
manslaughter would better achieve it. 
There is, however, no reason to believe that time in prison would 
protect other suicidal individuals in society.  In fact, research indicates 
that in these situations, the person who commits suicide manipulates 
others into assisting or encouraging their suicide.211  According to this 
theory, suicidal individuals often respond to stress with “helplessness, 
clinging, asking to be told what to do, and wanting to be looked after, 
and a suicide attempt may be an effort to coerce such support.”212  Even 
trained therapists fall victim to this coercion, so it is not surprising that 
those close to the individual find themselves drawn into a loved one’s 
plan for suicide.213  If this is true, then restraining the person who 
assisted or encouraged the suicide will not actually protect other 
suicidal individuals, who might manipulate another loved one to 
encourage or help plan their suicide.214  This dynamic makes 
encouraging suicide a unique situation in which incapacitation of the 
offender does not actually protect those who are at risk of becoming 
victims of the offense.  Neither the statutory solution, nor the current 
approach under a theory of manslaughter, truly serves the goal of 
restraining the offender to prevent them from further hurting society.  
Because incapacitation for any length of time does not protect society, 
the offender should only be restrained long enough to serve the other 
goals of punishment.  Longer prison terms would not serve the goal of 
incapacitation—protecting society—any more than a short prison 
term. 
3. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is a theory of punishment that argues for providing 
offenders the appropriate treatment in order to reintegrate the 
offender into society as law-abiding citizens.215  Unlike the other goals 
 
 211  See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 355 (“Suicidal persons often have ‘learned to use 
the anxiety that they can arouse in others about their death in a coercive or 
manipulative way.’”); see also Hendin, supra note 204, at 293 (noting that both 
terminally ill patients who ask to die and people who are otherwise suicidal are often 
motivated by a desire to test the affection of others). 
 212  Shaffer, supra note 82, at 355 (internal citations omitted). 
 213  See id. at 355–56.  
 214  See id. at 355. 
 215  See Dugger, supra note 180, at 402 (citing JAMES M. BURNS & JOSEPH S. MATTINA, 
SENTENCING 1-5 (1978)).  Some have criticized this theory because the definition of 
rehabilitation varies, which results in different kinds of “treatment” in different 
situations. See also Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 
1261–68 (2013) (arguing that most discussions of rehabilitation as a goal of 
punishment are imprecise because the concept of rehabilitation is actually made up 
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of punishment, rehabilitation seeks to help the offender as well as 
society.  The offender benefits by being purged of their “moral 
sickness” and reaccepted into society, and society benefits from 
another productive member.216  According to one definition of 
rehabilitation, the prosecution and punishment itself is rehabilitative 
because it gives the offender more perfect information on the chances 
of being caught committing the offense.217  A more contemporary 
understanding of rehabilitation argues that punishment should help 
the offender reintegrate into society by reforming the offender’s 
character or by medical treatment.218 
The punishment of encouraging suicide, whether by specific 
statute or otherwise, will achieve the first kind of rehabilitation by 
providing the offender with more perfect information for forming 
future decisions.  For example, Michelle will likely think twice before 
encouraging another person to carry out a plan to commit suicide, 
regardless of whether she was charged with manslaughter or under a 
specific statute prohibiting encouragement.219  However, a longer 
prison sentence is not likely to result in the second kind of 
rehabilitation: helping the offender reintegrate into society.  To the 
contrary, the American prison system has largely failed to achieve 
reformation of prisoners.220  Incarceration itself has been found to have 
negative psychological effects on prison inmates.221  A long prison term 
 
of various components). 
 216  See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in 
Moral Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 143 (1993); see also Ryan, supra note 215, 
at 1264–67. 
 217  See Barnes, supra note 80, at 634. 
 218  See Ryan, supra note 215, at 1264–65; see also Meghan Ryan, Science and the New 
Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 327–28 (2015) [hereinafter Science] (“Today, 
commentators on rehabilitation often focus almost exclusively on offenders’ behaviors 
and reintegration into society.”). 
 219  Some scholars have criticized this assumption, arguing that it fails to take 
account of recidivism rates among offenders.  See Barnes, supra note 80, at 634; Ryan, 
supra note 215, at 1267 (“[A]ny potential benefits of reintegrating rehabilitated 
offenders back into society also hinge on the offenders not re-offending.”).  However, 
because prosecution for encouraging or assisting suicide is sporadic and inconsistent, 
there is no data regarding rates of recidivism.  
 220  See Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War 
on Prisoners,” 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 191 (2010) (documenting the failure of 
rehabilitative programs in American corrections because “program-oriented officials 
typically lacked funding and personnel commensurate to the task at hand”).   
 221  See id. at 192 (“Rather than focusing exclusively on the presumed pathology of 
prisoners to account for post-prison problems and possible recidivism, [in their book 
C-Unit: Search for Community in Prison, Studt, Messinger, and Wilson’s analysis] placed 
part of the blame on the nature of institutions in which [the prisoners] had been kept.  
It was one sign among many of a growing recognition that powerful and potentially 
destructive forces at work in prison, even within the very programs that were designed 
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may exacerbate Michelle’s emotional and psychological problems, 
making her more likely to commit a crime in the future.  Instead, 
rehabilitation may justify a shortened sentence or diversion to non-
incarcerative programs because the offender is more likely to improve 
outside of prison.222  Conviction under a statute for assisting or 
encouraging suicide would result in a shorter prison term than a 
conviction for manslaughter, thus reducing the possibility that 
incarceration can inflict severe negative psychological effects on 
Michelle and other offenders like her. 
4. Retribution 
Lastly, the theory of retribution argues that offenders should be 
punished because “crime inherently merits punishment.”223  
Punishment for retribution gives offenders what they deserve and 
prevents the punishment of those who do not deserve it.  Retributive 
punishment does not seek to achieve social benefits, but instead seeks 
to inflict harm on someone who deserves it.224 Thus, retributive theory 
calls for punishment even when no social benefit will result, a fact that 
sets it apart from the other utilitarian theories of punishment.225  
Though sometimes considered the original purpose of punishment,226 
recent scholarship has recast retributivism as a method of limiting 
punishment, giving offenders only as much punishment as they 
deserve.227  This gives rise to the difficulty with assigning desert: how 
 
to help produce positive change in the name of rehabilitation.”) (discussing ELLIOT 
STUDT ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 3 (1968)). 
 222  See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an 
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2000).   
 223  See id. at 1315.  Retribution in this sense is also called “social retribution,” as 
opposed to “individual-oriented vengeance” which refers to the satisfaction that 
individuals feel when a criminal is punished.  See Paul Boudreaux, Criminal Law: Booth 
v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 177, 184 (1989). 
 224  See Cotton, supra note 223, at 1315–16. 
 225  See id. at 1316. 
 226  See Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053–54 (2012) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Proximate Retribution] (tracing retributivism back to the Hammurabi 
Code of about 1760 BC and the Bible). 
 227  See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1302 (2006) (internal quotations omitted) (criticizing the modern 
view that “desert is a limiting principle, a principle that, though it would rarely tell us 
the exact sanction to be imposed . . . would nevertheless give us the outer limits of 
leniency and severity which should not be exceeded”); see also Ryan, Proximate 
Retribution, supra note 226, at 1062 (“[T]he permutation of . . . modern retributivism 
that has gained the most traction among courts and scholars is ‘limiting retributivism,’ 
which uses the tenets of ordinary retributivism to determine the appropriate endpoints 
on an acceptable range of punishment and uses consequentialist theories to determine 
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does retributivist theory decide who deserves to be punished and how 
much punishment the offender deserves?228  Under one theory, 
protective retributivism, punishment would look to the harms society 
suffered as a result of the offender’s action.229  Under another theory, 
victim vindication, the degree of punishment the offender deserves is 
that which would “even the score” between the offender and the victim 
of his or her crime.230 
Encouraging suicide is considered a threat to the “interests in the 
sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws . . . 
even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the 
request, of the suicide victim.”231  In Michelle’s case, many people 
might find what Michelle did morally repugnant—something even her 
lawyer, Joseph Cataldo, acknowledges.232  Some have called her actions 
“horrendous,” and others have commented that “there should be some 
way that society punishes this behavior.”233  Similarly, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals called encouraging suicide “morally reprehensible” 
but ultimately not a crime, because there was no statute in Michigan 
prohibiting it.234  Punishing encouragement of suicide under a specific 
statute would punish the offender, serving society’s need for 
retribution.  At the same time, it would also serve the limiting principle 
of modern retributivism, by allowing for a shorter sentence.  A shorter 
sentence is more proportionate to the crime of the person who 
encouraged a suicide.  Under the protectionist view of retribution, 
offenders should be punished in proportion to their crime.  Michelle’s 
actions, while reprehensible, do not rise to the level of culpability of 
an accidental shooting235 or providing a gun to someone intent on 
committing suicide.236  Choosing between manslaughter and a specific 
 
the particular punishment within that range.”). 
 228  See Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 226, at 1064–69. 
 229  See id. at 1066–67. 
 230  See id. at 1068–69. 
 231  In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Cal. 1983). 
 232  See Susan Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime?, VICE (Sept. 2, 
2015), http://www.vice.com/read/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-
902?utm_source=vicetwitteurs (“Cataldo maintains Carter was simply exercising her 
freedom of speech and that her words do not add up to a manslaughter charge.  Her 
messages may be disturbing, but they are not criminal, he says.  ‘If you find it 
repugnant that’s fine,’ says Cataldo.”). 
 233  See Slifer, supra note 5. 
 234  See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 235  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877); Commonwealth v. 
McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871 
N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007). 
 236  Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1961). 
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statute, the victim vindication theory of retributivism would also 
require the less severe of the two.  The evidence that the “victims” of 
encouraged suicide often manipulate their loved ones into helping 
them tends to show that there is much less of a score to “even” in the 
case of this specific crime.237 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the news spread that Bristol County Massachusetts was 
charging Michelle Carter with manslaughter for encouraging her 
boyfriend to commit suicide, some questioned whether her actions 
actually constituted manslaughter.238  Her actions did not fit the 
public’s preconceived notion of what manslaughter is.  Her case 
seemed to be an anomaly, prompting widespread media attention.  
However, a close look at both at English common law and cases in 
various states proves that her case is not the first of its kind.  Because 
Massachusetts law allows prosecutors to treat any and all 
encouragement or assistance of suicide under a theory of 
manslaughter, there have been inconsistent outcomes that do little to 
advance the goals of punishment.  As the above analysis indicates, a 
specific statute that prohibits encouragement and assistance of suicide 
will better serve the goals of punishment and is preferable to the 
current approach.  A statutory solution will allow the legislature within 
each state to clarify this area of law; otherwise, prosecutors will 
continue to make due with an unclear legal landscape and an 
antiquated punishment for an act that has become more nuanced due 
to modern technology. 
 
 
 237  See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 238  See Zalkind, supra note 232. 
